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Civil Conflict and Agenda-Setting Speed in the United Nations
Security Council
MARTIN BINDER AND JONATHAN GOLUB
University of Reading
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can respond to a civil conflict only if that conflict first enters the Council’s
agenda. Some conflicts reach the Council’s agenda within days after they start, others after years (or even decades), and
some never make it. So far, only a few studies have looked at the crucial UNSC agenda-setting stage, and none have examined
agenda-setting speed. To fill this important gap, we develop and test a novel theoretical framework that combines insights from
realist and constructivist theory with lessons from institutionalist theory and bargaining theory. Applying survival analysis to
an original dataset, we show that the parochial interests of the permanent members (P-5) matter, but they do not determine
the Council’s agenda-setting speed. Rather, P-5 interests are constrained by normative considerations and concerns for the
Council’s organizational mission arising from the severity of a conflict (in terms of spillover effects and civilian casualties); by
the interests of the widely ignored elected members (E-10); and by the degree of preference heterogeneity among both the
P-5 and the E-10. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of how the United Nations (UN) works, and they have
implications for the UN’s legitimacy.
Introduction
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is designed to
respond quickly to conflicts and crises. Its actions should be
not only effective, but also “prompt” (UN Charter, Art. 24).
To that end, the Council must function “continuously,” and
each Council member must be represented “at all times” at
the seat of the organization (Art. 24, 28). The need for the
Council to address conflicts early on is regularly emphasized
by United Nations (UN) officials and policymakers, while
scholars argue that the Council’s capacity to act fast is a key
feature that makes the institution attractive to UN member
states (Abbott and Snidal 1998, 10).
However, for the Council to take (swift) action in a con-
flict, the conflict must first enter its agenda. Only once the
Council members agree to discuss a conflict in a formal
Council meeting—and thereby put it on the agenda—can
they take specific decisions (in the form of resolutions),
such as condemning the use of violence, imposing an arms
embargo, or deploying a peacekeeping or peace enforce-
ment operation.
With the end of the Council’s Cold War paralysis, some
conflicts have entered the Council’s agenda with remark-
able speed. For instance, Council members convened a for-
mal meeting to discuss the situation in Libya only six days af-
ter the popular uprising against long-time ruler al-Qaddafi
had turned into armed conflict and the rebels had taken
Benghazi on February 26, 2011. The Council was also quick
to put the conflicts in Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Mali on
its agenda. In other cases, however, the pace of agenda set-
ting in the Council was much slower. For instance, the civil
conflict in Uganda entered the Council’s agenda only in
2006—more than ten years after the onset of the conflict.
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The North-South conflict in Sudan that escalated into a
full-blown civil war in the mid-1980s was addressed by the
Council only twenty years later (in 2003). Many conflicts
never make it onto the Council’s agenda.
What explains this variation in the Council’s agenda-
setting speed? Why do some conflicts enter the Council’s
agenda faster than others? While UNSC decision-making—
and intervention resolutions in particular—has received a
great deal of academic attention, only a few studies focus
on the Council’s agenda setting, and so far no study has ex-
amined the Council’s agenda-setting speed. This is unfor-
tunate because whether, and if so how quickly, a conflict
makes it onto the Council’s agenda matters. For one, be-
ing on the Council’s agenda is a necessary (but not suffi-
cient) condition for subsequent Council action. Getting an
item on the agenda quickly is a precondition for early ac-
tion, and early action is widely considered to be more ef-
fective in that it is likely to reduce the number of victims
and lower the risk of a conflict spilling over to other neigh-
boring countries (Dowty and Loescher 1996, 42; Saleyhan
and Gledtisch 2006). Moreover, even in the absence of sub-
sequent action, putting a conflict on the Council’s agenda is
an important political act that imposes costs on the Council
members (Allen and Yuen 2017). Unlike informal Council
meetings that are held behind closed doors, in formal Coun-
cil meetings public records are kept. As such, discussing a
conflict in a Council meeting sends an important signal to
various relevant audiences that the Council considers the
conflict to constitute a threat to international peace and se-
curity.1 Equally important, once the Council members agree
to put a conflict on the agenda, it becomes “sticky” and can-
not be easily removed from the agenda later on. Not sur-
prisingly, then, Council and non-Council members attach
a great deal of importance to UNSC agenda setting. When
the Council sought to reform its working methods to make
it easier to delete items from its formal agenda (the so-called
Summary Statement), this was vociferously resisted by a num-
ber of UN members (Sievers and Daws 2014, 230). Finally,
1Putting a conflict situation on the agenda is a political decision; it does not
amount to a legal determination that it is a threat to international peace and
security in the sense of Art. 39 (Sievers and Daws 2014, 218).
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2 Civil Conflict and Agenda-Setting Speed in the United Nations Security Council
unlike Council decisions, agenda setting is covered by proce-
dural vote, meaning that the five permanent members (P-5)
have no veto right and cannot formally control the Coun-
cil’s agenda. Many different actors can call for an item to be
placed on the agenda of a formal meeting, and once they
do, the positive support of any nine members is sufficient.
Recent studies on UN intervention have examined two
broad explanatory factors that we argue help explain, but
do not fully account for, variation in agenda-setting speed.
From the traditional realist perspective on international or-
ganizations (IOs), decisions in the UNSC are determined
by the parochial interests of the powerful P-5 (de Jonge
Oudraat 1996; Boulden 2006; Bosco 2009), whereas recent
studies drawing on constructivism point to the importance
of humanitarian considerations as well as the desire to ful-
fil the UN’s organizational mission to preserve international
peace and security (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Mullenbach
2005; Fortna 2008; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Allen and
Yuen 2014).
Building on these insights, this article adds to the exist-
ing scholarship in several important ways. First, it advances
our understanding of how IOs work by going beyond the
narrow focus on Council resolutions to examine the crucial
agenda-setting stage. We examine agenda setting in the con-
text of civil conflict because civil conflict presents a major
challenge to the Council and makes up the bulk of its work
(von Einsiedel, Malone, and Ugarte 2015, 6).
Second, the article proposes a novel theoretical frame-
work that combines insights from realist and constructivist
International Relations (IR) theory with lessons from insti-
tutionalist theory and bargaining theory—especially work
on European Union (EU) decision-making—to focus on
four drivers of agenda setting: (1) P-5 interests; (2) norma-
tive considerations and the UN’s organizational mission; (3)
the interests of the Council’s ten elected members (E-10);
and (4) the distribution of preferences in the Council. We
argue and show that while the P-5 have no formal veto in
the agenda-setting process, their parochial interests matter,
and they matter strongly. However, they do not determine
the Council’s agenda-setting speed. Rather, P-5 interests are
constrained by normative considerations and concerns for
the Council’s organizational mission arising from the sever-
ity of a conflict (in terms of spillover effects and civilian ca-
sualties); by the interests of the widely ignored E-10; and by
the degree of preference heterogeneity among both the P-5
and the E-10. Overall, in terms of the relative explanatory
power of different factors, we find that the effect of the E-10
on agenda-setting speed can be greater than that of the P-5,
and that parochial interests and general preference hetero-
geneity appear to play a bigger role in UNSC agenda setting
than do conflict characteristics and the UN’s organizational
mission.
Third, the article makes a methodological contribution
by providing the first survival analysis (also known as “event
history analysis”) of UNSC agenda setting, which reveals in-
sights about the speed with which the Council becomes in-
volved in conflicts as well as the likelihood that, at any given
point in time, a particular conflict will reach the Council’s
agenda at all. We apply survival analysis to an original dataset
that includes information on the time that elapses between
the onset of 276 episodes of civil conflict and the time those
episodes were included on the Council’s agenda.
Fourth, our findings also have implications for the
Council’s legitimacy.2 For the Council’s performance
2Legitimacy denotes the right to rule, the normatively appropriate exercise
of political authority. We use it here in its normative sense, meaning that an actor
legitimacy—its ability to fulfil its mandate and to collec-
tively solve problems (Scharpf 1999; Gutner and Thompson
2010)—timing is crucial because it arguably matters
whether the Council addresses a deadly conflict after six
days or only after six months (or never). Our finding that
agenda-setting speed is positively associated with conflict
severity supports the UNSC’s performance legitimacy. By
contrast, our findings havemixed implications for the Coun-
cil’s procedural legitimacy—fair procedures that reflect a
broad range of UN member state interests (Tyler 2006;
Binder and Heupel 2015). The finding that parochial P-5 in-
terests skew agenda-setting speed undermines the Council’s
procedural legitimacy, whereas the finding that speed also
depends on the interests of the E-10 increases the inclusive-
ness of the Council’s agenda-setting process, thus improving
procedural legitimacy.
We structure our analysis as follows. After a review of pre-
vious research on the UNSC to identify gaps in the litera-
ture, we introduce our theory and hypotheses about the de-
terminants of UNSC agenda-setting speed. This is followed
by a discussion of our data and methods. The final section
presents the results and highlights the implications of our
findings.
Prior Research
The standard realist informed view has been that Coun-
cil decisions are largely determined by the parochial inter-
ests of the P-5 and that the E-10 are inconsequential (de
Jonge Oudraat 1996; O’Neill 1996; Bosco 2009; Hosli et al.
2011). Yet recent research on the UNSC has begun to ques-
tion the explanatory power of P-5 interests and the irrele-
vance of the E-10. Drawing on constructivist IR theory, many
studies find that normative considerations and the organiza-
tion’s mission to address threats to international peace and
security also matter, perhaps even more so than P-5 inter-
ests (Mullenbach 2005; Fortna 2008; Beardsley and Schmidt
2012; Binder 2017).
Only a few studies have focused on the Council’s agenda-
setting process, but their results are inconclusive, and none
have examined agenda-setting speed. Again, the predomi-
nant realist view has been that, just like any subsequent de-
cisions, agenda setting in the Council is largely controlled
by the P-5. Boulden (2006, 412) claims that “the simple
existence of the veto, even if not formally exercised, gives
the permanent members the ability to control the Coun-
cil’s agenda.” Iwanami (2011) focuses on civil wars between
1946 and 1999 and finds support for the P-5 interests expla-
nation. Her results suggest that civil wars that involve a P-5
ally or occur in a former P-5 colony are less likely to enter
the Council’s agenda, whereas those where a P-5 member
has previously intervened are more likely to do so. Iwanami
does not find support for the constructivist view, as the
battle deaths variable tests out as insignificant. Frederking
and Patane (2017) examine which conflicts “dominate” the
UNSC’s agenda (2017, 349) by counting the number of
meetings per conflict each year over the period 1991–2013.
Their findings challenge the realist view in that they find
severe conflicts to be significantly more likely to dominate
the Council’s agenda, whereas P-5 interests in a conflict, as
or institution has legitimacy if it conforms to external standards usually derived
from democratic theory. We focus here on two such standards that are widely
considered to be key to the legitimacy of IOs: the quality of their procedures
and their performance (Scharpf 1999; Binder and Heupel 2015; Dellmuth and
Tallberg 2015). But they are not the only ones. Others discuss various additional
standards of IO legitimacy such as the provision of expertise or respect for human
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measured by arms transfers and trade, test out as insignif-
icant. Finally, Allen and Yuen (2017) focus on the time it
takes the Council to act on a broad range of items that are
already on its agenda, but they suspect that P-5 members
keep issues directly tied to their interests off the agenda in
the first place.
Overall, research on agenda setting in the Council is
sparse and has produced inconclusive findings, and thus far
no study has examined agenda-setting speed. To begin to
fill this gap, we propose a theoretical framework for under-
standing UNSC agenda-setting speed that builds on insights
from the realist and constructivist inspired literature on UN
intervention and agenda setting. Yet because the P-5 have
no formal veto at the agenda-setting stage and thus need to
reach out to the E-10, and given the importance of prefer-
ence heterogeneity for cooperation, we go beyond the dom-
inant approaches in the study of the UN to also draw on
institutionalist and bargaining theory.
Theories and Hypotheses
The Agenda-Setting Process
How do civil conflicts enter the Council’s agenda? Accord-
ing to the UN Charter, meetings will “be held at the call
of the [Council] President at any time he deems neces-
sary,” and in practice the process is usually routine, since
“Council members are planning in advance for each up-
coming presidency,” and most agenda items simply roll over
from previous meetings (Sievers and Daws 2014, 193). But
not all Council business is routine. When the Council is re-
quested to take up a new item, such as addressing a civil
conflict, the Council President needs to make available ad-
ditional meeting time, either by scheduling a new meeting
or by altering the agenda of an already planned upcoming
meeting. To model UN Security Council agenda setting, we
therefore need to focus attention on two things: decision-
making rules and the preferences of relevant actors. For a
start, we must identify which actors have the authority to
set and modify the agenda, and any procedural rules that
constrain that authority. A wide range of actors can bring a
situation to the Council’s attention. These include Council
members themselves, other UN member states (UN Char-
ter, Art. 35(1)), non-UN member states (Art. 35(2)), UN
bodies (Art. 11(2)), as well as the UN Secretary General
(Art. 99). If the Council President—rotating in English al-
phabetical order every calendar month—receives such a re-
quest by any of these actors, they shall call a meeting within
fourteen days, in consultation with the other Council mem-
bers. The Council President has some discretion here, since
they can refrain from calling a meeting if they sense a lack
of agreement among Council members (Sievers and Daws
2014, 196–7). In practice, if only some Council members
agree on discussing an item, the Council President usually
proposes to place the item on the provisional agenda of a
new meeting or an upcoming meeting, and those members
who disagree have the right to request a procedural vote. To
adopt the agenda then requires nine positive votes without a
right to veto for the P-5.3 If Council members adopt the provi-
sional agenda and discuss a matter during a formal meeting,
3Note that for our purposes it does not matter that there is no way to distin-
guish between the two means by which those opposed can prevent discussion of
civil conflicts: somehow convince the requesting states(s) not to press for a formal
meeting, or, if the meeting goes ahead, somehow convince the President to keep
the item off the agenda.
it is then listed in the Summary Statement of matters of which the
Security Council is seized.4
Inevitably, the level of disagreement among Council
members about whether to place a conflict on the agenda
will vary across conflicts. Because we lack information on
the precise preference location for each actor on each con-
flict, it is not possible to deploy a range of powerful analyti-
cal tools from procedural and bargaining models to identify
the pivotal state(s), measure the precise size of the core and
the winset, or compute an expected bargaining outcome
(Tsebelis 2002; Thomson 2011; Drüner et al. 2018). How-
ever, one thing is certain: in the absence of agreement, the
reversion point is the status quo where the conflict is not on
the agenda.
The key theoretical question, therefore, is which factors
tend to increase the likelihood that at any given point in
time (at least) a nine-vote coalition will form in favor of
changing the status quo and placing an item on the agenda.
We develop hypotheses about four types of factors: (1) inter-
ests of the P-5; (2) normative considerations and the UN’s
organizational mission; (3) interests of the E-10; and (4) the
level of general preference heterogeneity in the Council,
among the P-5 as well as among the E-10.
P-5 Interests
According to the standard realist view, IOs are nothing more
than tools that serve powerful member states to advance
their parochial interests (Mearsheimer 1994). Scholars ar-
gue that the possession of the veto over subsequent resolu-
tions and (perhaps even more so) their economic and mil-
itary power enable the P-5 to dominate the agenda-setting
process. The P-5 can exercise their veto to prevent any Coun-
cil decision they oppose (de Jonge Oudraat 1996; O’Neill
1996; Bosco 2009; Hosli et al. 2011), or they can deploy
their vast resources to bribe the E-10 with side payments
(Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland
2009a, 2009b; Allen and Yuen 2017, 12), or they can coerce
them with threats to act outside the Council (Voeten 2001).
According to Keating (2015, 146), the P-5 decide “what will
be discussed and when. It is now common place for P-5
members…to control the Council and exclude discussion
of items they find inconvenient.”
While many analysts agree that the P-5 dominate UNSC
decision-making, including at the agenda-setting stage, they
disagree over the causal direction of those interests. Some
argue that civil conflicts are less likely to enter the agenda
if they involve the interests of the P-5. On this view, the
permanent members have an incentive to bypass the UN
as they wish to exclude the interference of other members
from areas under their spheres of influence (de Jonge
Oudraat 1996; Boulden 2006; Fortna 2008). Others, by
contrast, argue that conflicts that involve the interest of
any permanent member are more likely to enter the agenda.
This is because UN involvement provides burden-sharing,
which reduces the costs of the permanent member trying to
resolve the conflict themselves, and also provides legitimacy
for new or ongoing intervention (Voeten 2001; Wallensteen
2002; Hurd 2007). These contrasting logics lead us to
expect that civil conflicts that directly involve the parochial
interest of one or more P-5 members will make it either
harder or easier to build a nine-vote coalition and place a
conflict on the agenda.
4The Summary Statement contains matters that have been on the agenda of
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H1a/b: The speed with which a conflict enters the UNSC agenda is
negatively/positively associated with the existence of direct P-5 mem-
ber interests in that conflict.
Normative Considerations and Organizational Mission
Drawing on constructivist IO scholarship, we expect that the
speed with which a conflict reaches the Council’s agenda is
driven by humanitarian considerations and emerging norms
of humanitarian intervention (Sandholtz 2002; Finnemore
2003; Carpenter 2005). In line with this theory, scholars
have pointed to conflict severity—in terms of human suf-
fering and destabilizing spillover effects resulting from a
conflict—as a prominent explanation for UN action (de
Jonge Oudraat 1996; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Beardsley
and Schmidt 2012; Hultman 2013; Binder 2017). Conflict
severity operates through two distinct logics. First, if many
people suffer and die in a conflict, this generates norma-
tive pressure on Council members to take rapid action to
respond to that conflict. Observers of the Council point to
a humanitarian “imperative” (Luck 2006, 92) that Coun-
cil members experience when confronted with large-scale
suffering and the violation of international humanitarian
norms. Scholars argue that international societal actors, of-
ten in conjunction with the media, nongovernmental orga-
nizations, and domestic civil society organizations, play an
important role in this process in that they mobilize around
these norms to generate momentum for responding to sit-
uations of human suffering (Western 2002), in particular
among civilians (Hultman 2013). This leads us to expect
that severe civil conflicts generate more normative pressure
on Council members, thereby making it easier to build a
nine-vote coalition.
H2a: The greater the number of civilian casualties in a civil con-
flict, the higher the speed with which it enters the Council’s agenda.
Second, severe civil conflicts also tend to create signifi-
cant negative externalities, in that they diffuse into wider
regional wars and refugees spill over to destabilize neigh-
boring countries (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Kathman
2010). This poses a threat to the Council’s core organi-
zational mission—the maintenance of international peace
and stability (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012). Not living up
to the UN’s key organizational mandate risks undermining
the Council’s legitimacy and, by extension, the support it
receives from the UN membership. It also disincentivizes
states from contributing to an organization that routinely
fails to deliver the public good it was created to produce
(Beardsley and Schmidt 2012, 39). This leads us to expect
that strong spillover effects on neighboring countries, and
the resulting threat to the Council’s organizational mission,
will tend to make it easier to build a nine-vote coalition.
H2b: The stronger the spillover effects a civil conflict generates for
neighboring countries or regions, the faster the conflict will enter the
Council’s agenda.
E-10 Interests
Several strands of institutionalist theory provide strong theo-
retical reasons to believe that the elected Council members
are more than just placeholders and can have real influence
on the work of the Council, including its agenda-setting
process.5 We theorize that E-10 influence on agenda-setting
5 In fact, formal Council meetings have been held against the wish of per-
manent Council members. For instance, in July 2005, the Council addressed the
situation in Zimbabwe despite both China and Russia having voted against putting
speed stems not only from procedural rules that make at
least four of their members crucial for any nine-vote coali-
tion, but also from the E-10’s informal power resources, as
well as from constraints on the P-5’s subsequent veto. Ratio-
nalist institutionalist theory identifies procedural rules as a
nonmaterial, formal source of small state power (Keohane
and Nye 1977; Abbott and Snidal 1998). Procedural rules
have enabled small states to play a significant role in shap-
ing IO activity, for example multilateral development bank
behavior (Lyne, Nielson, and Tierney 2006). In the UNSC,
procedural rules have enabled the EU members of the E-10
to engage in issue linkage across IOs and thereby impact the
Council’s substantive work, promoting the security interests
of other European states (Mikulaschek 2018). Since UNSC
agenda setting is governed by the procedural vote, formally
any nine members can place an item on the agenda. Of
course, P-5 members might still try to dominate the agenda
by buying E-10 votes, but that strategy faces serious limita-
tions. Especially if the P-5 do not all agree about an agenda
item, this would involve one or two permanent members try-
ing to buy off up to seven elected members while facing po-
tential outbidding from opposing P-5 members.
Institutionalists have also highlighted important informal
constraints on the use of the P-5 veto right, including the
threat to use it. Mikulaschek (2016) argues that great pow-
ers exercise informal strategic restraint in order to generate
consensus and enhance compliance. Similarly, Krisch (2008,
139) contends that the P-5 strive for Council unanimity be-
cause this signals to a wide audience of states that UNSC de-
cisions are desirable and appropriate. We contend that these
informal constraints give elected members leverage beyond
their formal voting power at the agenda-setting stage since
E-10 efforts to shape the agenda are at least to some extent
conditioned on anticipation of subsequent decisions.
Yet other variants of institutionalist theory posit that IOs
are arenas for deliberation and public justification (Chayes
and Chayes 1995, 125) in which the power of the better ar-
gument carries the day, so that small states can exploit a
range of informal power resources to secure their objectives.
Johnstone (2003, 452, 461) conceives of the UNSC as a “fo-
rum for justificatory discourse” to emphasize how, regardless
of the P-5’s formal veto power, processes of legal discourse,
deliberation, and persuasion enable elected members to in-
fluence decisions. Accordingly, the E-10 can impact Council
discussions with their regional and local knowledge about
civil crises, as well as with the expertise and authority they
gain by chairing the Council’s subsidiary organs,6 and they
might also amplify their influence by focusing on a narrow
range of issues. New Zealand is a prominent example of an
influential elected member, but other elected members, in-
cluding small countries such as Austria, Costa Rica, Den-
mark, Guatemala, or Uganda, have demonstrated that de-
spite the P-5’s power “it is nevertheless still possible to assert
a leadership role in the Council” (Keating 2015, 152) by ex-
ploiting informal power resources such as technical exper-
tise or diplomatic skill. Lessons from decision-making in the
EU are particularly informative here. Just like the P-5 in the
Council, the “big four” states of France, Germany, Italy, and
the United Kingdom have a disproportionate amount of re-
sources and power in the EU, yet they do not dominate EU
decision-making, whether it be historic treaties or daily legis-
lation, and there is no evidence that they manage to buy the
the matter on the agenda. Likewise, in September 2006, China and Russia voted
against the inclusion on the Council’s agenda of the situation in Myanmar, yet the
meeting was eventually held and the conflict was discussed.
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votes of smaller states (Finke 2009; Golub 2012a, 2012b).
Informal power resources enable small states to punch well
above their weight: they possess technical expertise in partic-
ular areas, and they focus on fewer issues so that when they
do take a stand, their views have greater impact. Many stud-
ies have found that in terms of bargaining success over EU
legislative outcomes, small states do just as well as, or even
better than, the “big four” (Thomson 2011; Cross 2013).
If these various mechanisms for E-10 influence operate,
what are the observable implications for agenda-setting
speed? The E-10 often champion thematic issues such as
“women, peace, and security” or climate change (Allen and
Yuen 2017, 11), but there is evidence that they use their
term also to advance their national interests. For instance,
Australia was successful in putting the downing of Malaysian
Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) over eastern Ukraine on the
Council’s agenda. For Langmore and Farrall (2016, 65),
this represents “a clear example of an elected member
successfully influencing a Council outcome that served
its own national interests.” Likewise, Mikulaschek (2016)
shows how elected African members use their influence to
successfully push the Council toward deploying peacekeep-
ers to civil conflicts in Africa. We expect that the E-10 use
their influence to advance their conflict-specific parochial
interests, and just as with the P-5, the direction of the effect
of parochial interests could plausibly cut either way. While
a negative effect is possible, it is arguably less likely than
for the P-5, since the E-10 typically do not have spheres of
influence from which they seek to exclude UN interference.
In our view, it is more likely that E-10 states with a direct
interest in a conflict will view UN involvement as positive,
a source of burden-sharing that reduces the costs of them
trying to resolve the conflict themselves.
H3: The speed with which a conflict enters the UNSC agenda is pos-
itively associated with the existence of direct E-10 members’ interests
in that conflict.
General Preference Heterogeneity
Finally, we draw on bargaining theory to formulate hypothe-
ses about how the distribution of preferences in the Coun-
cil affects agenda-setting speed. Bargaining theorists have
established that preference heterogeneity among decision-
makers increases distributional conflict and complicates co-
operative efforts (Schneider and Urpelainen 2014). Hetero-
geneity increases the time needed to reach agreement and
depart from the status quo, because in a world of imper-
fect information, it raises the transaction costs of identifying
each actor’s interests, as well as feasible log-rolls, package
deals, and side payments (Sommerer and Tallberg 2016).
This logic informs studies that predict that heterogeneity in
the Council of Ministers will slow down EU decision-making
(Klüver and Sagarzazu 2013; Drüner et al. 2018), that het-
erogeneity among political parties slows down coalition for-
mation (Martin and Vanberg 2003), and that actor hetero-
geneity has a negative effect on the decision-making capacity
of IOs more generally (Sommerer and Tallberg 2016).
Although they do not consider the issue of speed, re-
cent studies have argued that UNSC decision-making de-
pends not just on the parochial interests of the permanent
members, but also on the extent to which their more gen-
eral interests overlap. Allen and Yuen (2014) argue that a
more heterogeneous P-5 makes it harder for the permanent
members to agree on the mandate of a mission, resulting in
less-specific mandates and more frequent mandate reviews.
Similarly, Beardsley and Schmidt (2012, 45) argue that the
UN is less able to act in international crises when there is
greater P-5 preference heterogeneity, “when there is starker
divergence between the two most divergent P-5 states.” A
straightforward extension of Beardsley and Schmidt’s argu-
ment that follows from bargaining theory is that just as P-5
preference heterogeneity makes it harder for the UNSC to
alter the status quo of “no involvement,” it makes it harder
and more time consuming for the UNSC to alter the status quo
of a conflict not being on the agenda.
H4a: A higher level of P-5 preference heterogeneity in the Council
results in conflicts entering the agenda more slowly.
Formally, any nine members can place an item on the
Council’s agenda. More likely, though, is a scenario whereby
a small number of P-5 states, typically the P-3 (France, the
United Kingdom, and the United States), perhaps even just
one, lead a winning coalition of nonelected members. But
the impetus could also originate within the E-10 as in 1994
when New Zealand pushed to get a UNSC response to the
genocide in Rwanda (Keating 2015), or in 2004 when Ger-
many strongly advocated for a response in the Darfur con-
flict (Nitzschke 2015). Australia has played a leading role on
numerous occasions, often despite the reluctance of various
P-5 members, for example in regard to Afghanistan, human-
itarian relief for Syria, and as mentioned above, the shoot-
ing down of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 (Langmore and
Farrall 2016). Either way, we contend that the importance of
heterogeneity should extend beyond just the P-5. If the E-10
members are trying to decide among themselves whether
to place an item on the agenda, their heterogeneity should
increase transaction costs and slow down agreement. And
if one or several P-5 members are trying to build a win-
ning coalition with the E-10, reaching out to craft a deal—
or more likely multiple deals—with a highly divided group
will take longer than when that group holds more uniform
views.
H4b: A higher level of E-10 preference heterogeneity in the Council
results in conflicts entering the agenda more slowly.
Research Design and Data
Given that the UNSC was virtually paralyzed during the Cold
War, and that the fundamental dynamics of the Council
changed dramatically thereafter, our hypotheses only apply
to the situation after 1989. Our central puzzle is to explain
variation in how long it takes for civil conflicts to reach the
Council’s agenda in the post–Cold War era. The set of con-
flicts come from the UCDP/PRIO (Uppsala Conflict Data
Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo) Armed Conflict
dataset. We focus on internal and internationalized internal
conflicts, rather than on extrasystemic or interstate armed
conflicts. We exclude conflicts when they involve only low
activity, defined by UCDP criteria as fewer than twenty-five
fatalities per year. A given conflict can last many years and
have multiple episodes, reaching the twenty-five fatalities
threshold, then subsiding back to low activity before even-
tually flaring up again. Our unit of observation is therefore
the conflict-episode-day.
To analyze the determinants of agenda-setting speed, we
employ survival analysis. Each conflict episode that begins
after January 1, 1990 becomes at risk of being placed on
the agenda once it rises above the level of low activity. Con-
flict episodes that began before the end of 1989 and con-
tinue into the post–Cold War era are coded as becoming
at risk as of January 1, 1990 (or later if they have not al-
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“survives” until it reaches the agenda (the “event”) or until it
is right-censored. Right-censoring occurs when the conflict
dies back down to low activity, or when the conflict termi-
nates, or on January 1, 2017 when we stopped tracking the
Council’s agenda.
The quantity of interest in survival analysis is the hazard
rate, and both speed and outcome are intrinsically associ-
ated with this rate. Indeed, unlike models that ignore du-
ration, the extra information about timing exploited by the
survival approach is valuable precisely because it yields more
accurate inferences about the pattern of eventual outcomes
(Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones
2004, 1). Thus, we can explain not only the relative speed
with which conflicts reach the agenda, but also whether
conflicts with particular covariate profiles are likely ever to
reach the agenda. Because we have no strong theoretical
predictions about the effect of time on agenda setting—
conflict episodes might be more likely to reach the agenda
as soon as the episode starts, or perhaps pressure tends to
build steadily, or maybe it follows a more complex pattern
with waves of support—we fit Cox models. An important
advantage of Cox models is that they do not require any
assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 47).
Dependent Variable
Our analysis uses original data to construct the dependent
variable. For each conflict episode, we coded the time
elapsed between when it became “active” (start_date2 in
the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset) and when it first
entered the Council’s agenda or was right-censored. The
“active” threshold is widely used in published studies to
distinguish signal from noise. Besides convention, we adopt
this threshold also because we assume that given the scarcity
of UNSC agenda time, only active episodes are at risk of
reaching the agenda. We do not adopt a higher threshold
because we assume that the UNSC often deems it impor-
tant to discuss active civil conflicts before they escalate,
potentially into full-blown wars (i.e., reach the 1,000 deaths
in a given year threshold).7 A conflict reaches the agenda
if the Council agrees to hold a formal meeting to discuss
that conflict. Information about formal Council meetings
(day/month/year) and the agenda item discussed in each
meeting (there is only one item per meeting) is available
through UN websites. Specifically, we cross-checked two
sources of information: the United Nations Digital Library
and The Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council.8 The
advantage of the Repertoire is that, in addition to the pre-
cise date a meeting was first convened by the Council, it also
provides a more detailed description of each agenda item.
Thus, it is possible to link the item that is being discussed
at a meeting to a specific conflict episode.9 The resulting
dataset contains 145 conflicts and 276 conflict episodes (see
online appendix Table S1). Just under 30 percent of the
7 In their analysis of which conflicts dominate the UNSC agenda, Frederking
and Patane (2017) exclude all conflicts that never reached 1,000 deaths in a sin-
gle year. In our view, this discards crucial information and also creates a hindsight
bias. Nevertheless, we reran our analyses after dropping conflicts that never be-
came wars. The results, which we report in the supplementary online appendix,
confirm or even strengthen most of our original findings.
8https://digitallibrary.un.org/ and https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/
content/repertoire/agenda-items-overview.
9This is important because the formulation of agenda item titles is some-
times (deliberately) vague (e.g., “The situation in Liberia” or “Letter dated 10
August 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to
the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council”).
conflict episodes reach the UNSC agenda; the others are
right-censored.
On average, active conflict episodes survive for just over
three years before reaching the UNSC agenda, although
many are taken up immediately and some survive for over
twenty-seven years. Figure 1 displays this variation in the
form of a kernel density plot. Note that cases that are still
ongoing but right-censored on January 1, 2017 are treated
as having reached the agenda, which underestimates their
survival time.
Independent Variables
To test our hypotheses about the effect of P-5 and E-10
interests, we obtained information about four different
types of direct link between each Council member and the
country experiencing the conflict. First, a state will have
a stronger direct interest in a conflict when it has a for-
mal alliance tie with the country experiencing the conflict
(Mullenbach 2005, 452; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012, 40).
We used Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP)
data (Leeds et al. 2002) to generate yearly ordinal measures
of the total number of P-5 and the total number of E-10
states with alliance ties to the conflict state. For each of these
variables, to improve tractability, we then aggregated cate-
gories with a small number of cases to produce recoded or-
dinal variables with either three or four categories.
Second, any state is likely to have a stronger direct inter-
est in conflicts on its own doorstep. This might be because
it views a nearby conflict as being within its sphere of in-
fluence (Fortna 2008; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012, 40) or
because proximity increases the fear of contagion. We used
version 3.2 of the Correlates of War (COW) Direct Contigu-
ity dataset to code yearly dummies for whether each UNSC
member and the conflict state were directly contiguous. We
then aggregated these into two yearly ordinal measures: the
total number of contiguous P-5 states and the total number
of contiguous E-10 states. Due to small numbers in the high-
est categories we then recoded these into a P-5 contiguity
dummy and an E-10 contiguity dummy.
Following Frederking and Patane (2017), we anticipate
that the P-5 will have a stronger direct interest in conflicts
when they transfer arms to or conduct trade with the conflict
state. But given our expectation that E-10 states also mat-
ter to the speed of Council agenda setting, we extend the
same reasoning to E-10 arms transfers and trade. We used
the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database to compile yearly arms
transfers from each UNSC member to each conflict state.
We then aggregated these into two variables: the total yearly
volume of arms transfers to the conflict state from P-5 states
and the total yearly volume of arms transfers to the conflict
state from E-10 states. We used the COW Trade Dataset 4.0
(Barbieri and Keshk 2016) to calculate total yearly trade be-
tween the conflict state and the P-5 states, and between the
conflict state and the E-10 states.
To test our hypotheses about how conflict severity af-
fects agenda-setting speed, we measured the level of hu-
man suffering and spillover effects. The extent of hu-
man suffering in each conflict in any given year is coded
as the number of civilian deaths from version 18.1 of
the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg and
Melander 2013). To measure the spillover effects of each
conflict in any given year, we used the number of refugees
from the UNHCR Statistical Database 1977–2016 (http://
data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=UNHCR&f=indID%3AType-Ref).
To test our hypotheses about the effect of general pref-
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Figure 1. Kernel density plot of survival time until episodes reach the Council agenda
Note: Survival times are underestimated because of right-censoring.
states’ voting behavior in the UN General Assembly (Bailey,
Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017). We constructed two separate
measures of the range of preferences within the Council
each year, one for the P-5 and one for the E-10.
Results
Our estimation strategy is to keep each model as simple
as possible, avoiding a “garbage can” or “kitchen sink” ap-
proach, and then explore the robustness of the findings.
We believe this is a wise strategy since it is unlikely that we
have managed to identify the complete and true model, and
thus adding more variables can do more harm than good
(Clarke 2005). We also take steps to avoid post-treatment
bias, caused by controlling away for the consequences of
a covariate and “soaking up” some of its effects. The most
likely culprits here are the four different types of parochial
interests: alliance ties, arms transfers, trade, and contiguity.
States that are physically closer to each other are more likely
to form alliances, to trade, and to have more arms trans-
fers with each other (Gibler and Wolford 2006; Disdier and
Head 2008; Ackerman and Seim 2014). We therefore fit four
main models, one for each type of parochial interest. The
two trade variables are highly correlated (r = 0.88) so we
entered them separately. The two measures of conflict sever-
ity present another potential source of post-treatment bias,
since the number of cross-border migrants is arguably at
least partly a function of the number of civilian casualties.
However, recent research suggests that these two variables
are actually unrelated, and since the weakness of a correla-
tion is borne out in our dataset (r = 0.09) we include both
of them simultaneously in our models.
Table 1 presents the results of our main Cox models.
As recommended by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004,
137), we tested each covariate for violations in the propor-
tional hazards assumption and accommodated violations by
adding an interaction term of the form B*ln(t). Positive co-
efficients indicate a higher hazard rate and thus the like-
lihood that conflict episodes will reach the agenda more
quickly, whereas negative coefficients indicate a lower haz-
ard rate and slower agenda-setting speed. The hazard ratio
directly compares the hazard rate for two cases with differ-
ent covariate profiles. Profiles associated with extremely low
hazard ratios are far less likely to ever reach the agenda. For
covariates that also have a B*ln(t) term, the overall effect
of the covariate changes over time and one cannot simply
interpret the constituent terms—one needs to examine the
combined effect and the corresponding confidence interval
(Licht 2011).
We hypothesized that when one or more P-5 members
had a parochial interest in a conflict that this would signif-
icantly affect the speed with which the conflict entered the
Council’s agenda, but that the direction of the effect could
cut either way depending on whether P-5 parochial interests
reflected a concern to keep the UN out of their spheres of
influence or a desire to involve the UN as a burden-sharing
device. The results strongly support the conclusion that P-5
parochial interests matter but that they cut only one way, to
keep the UN out by slowing down the rate at which conflicts
reach the UNSC agenda. Model 1 examines the effect of al-
liance ties on UNSC agenda-setting speed. When only one
P-5 member has an alliance with the conflict state (which
occurs in 22 percent of the observations), the hazard ratio
is time-dependent. The effect of one P-5 ally is negative but
only materializes after about six months and then intensifies
very slowly. For the first 190 days of a conflict, the effect is
insignificant, after which it reduces the hazard ratio by 63
percent. When more than one P-5 member has an alliance
tie with the conflict state (49 percent of the observations)
the effect is immediate and even stronger, reducing the haz-
ard rate by about 70 percent.
Model 2 examines the effect of contiguity on UNSC
agenda-setting speed. When a P-5 member is contiguous
with a conflict state (54 percent of the time), it reduces
the hazard ratio by 80 percent. Model 3 examines the ef-
fect of arms transfers. A one standard deviation increase in
P-5 arms transfers to a conflict state reduces the hazard ratio
by 89 percent. Model 4 shows that a one standard deviation
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Table 1. Cox models of UN agenda-setting speed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
H1 P-5 allies 1 1.076 (0.684)
P-5 allies 1*ln(t) −0.392 (0.159)**
P-5 allies 2–3 −1.034 (0.596)*
P-5 allies 4–5 −1.414 (0.452)***
P-5 contiguity −1.621 (0.345)***
P-5 arms −0.00303 (0.00153)**
P-5 trade 0.0533 (0.0272)*
P-5 trade*ln(t) −0.121 (0.0408)***
H2 Civilian deaths (100s) 0.240 (0.0985)** 0.254 (0.0955)*** 0.136 (0.100) 0.239 (0.0950)** 0.234 (0.0932)**
Migrants (100,000s) −0.0326 (0.0619) −0.00953 (0.0706) −0.0458 (0.0600) 0.104 (0.0437)** 0.103 (0.0440)**
Migrants*ln(t) 0.0460 (0.0162)*** 0.0294 (0.0130)** 0.0371 (0.0128)***
H3 E-10 allies 1 0.246 (0.318)
E-10 allies 2 0.154 (0.628)
E-10 allies 2*ln(t) 0.0966 (0.118)
E-10 allies 3 0.475 (0.762)
E-10 allies 3*ln(t) 0.125 (0.158)
E-10 allies 4–7 1.144 (0.521)**
E-10 contiguity −0.510 (0.252)**
E-10 arms −0.0356 (0.0260)
E-10 trade 0.181 (0.113)
E-10 trade*ln(t) −0.514 (0.188)***
H4 P-5 heterogeneity −2.539 (1.085)** −3.445 (1.016)*** −3.182 (0.926)*** −0.853 (0.403)** −3.188 (1.319)**
P-5 heterogeneity*ln(t) 0.488 (0.207)** 0.574 (0.201)*** 0.550 (0.191)*** 0.581 (0.242)**
E-10 heterogeneity −1.199 (0.422)*** −1.248 (0.365)*** −1.221 (0.356)*** −1.100 (0.929) −1.274 (0.842)
E-10 heterogeneity*ln(t) −0.0647 (0.197) −0.0244 (0.189)
Observations 197,314 197,314 197,314 188,764 188,764
Log likelihood −330.2 −328.3 −330.7 −288.3 −284.0
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by conflict. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
the hazard ratio for the first week, but reduces it by 78 per-
cent after a month, by 88 percent after three months, and
by 94 percent after a year.
Our findings are consistent with the widely held real-
ist belief that P-5 parochial interests are key drivers of
UNSC decision-making, including at the agenda-setting
stage where they have no formal veto power. If P-5 interests
are at stake in a conflict, this significantly reduces the speed
with which the civil conflict makes it onto the Council’s
agenda. The negative effect of alliances supports Iwanami’s
(2011) study on UNSC agenda setting, but unlike Iwanami,
we also find support for the negative effect that P-5 contigu-
ity has on agenda-setting speed. At the same time, our find-
ings run counter to Frederking and Patane’s (2017) surpris-
ing finding that P-5 interests (in terms of arms transfers and
trade) have no significant effect on agenda setting in the
Council. Finally, our results are in line with recent studies on
UN intervention and peacekeeping (Fortna 2008; Beardsley
and Schmidt 2012), suggesting that the P-5 seek to keep the
UN out of their respective spheres of influence, rather than
involving it in burden-sharing.
We also hypothesized that more severe conflicts would
reach the UNSC agenda more quickly. The results mostly
support our expectations. For the civilian deaths variable,
across all five models, the sign is in the expected direction
and the estimated coefficient is statistically significant in
four of the five models. A one standard deviation increase
in the number of civilian deaths (212) raises the hazard ra-
tio by about 67 percent. This aligns with constructivist ar-
guments suggesting that Council members respond to a hu-
manitarian “imperative” in situations of large-scale human
suffering (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Mullenbach 2005;
Hultman 2013).
For the migrants variable, the results suggest that the
UN’s organizational mission to prevent regional destabiliza-
tion matters. After a brief delay, an increase in cross-border
migration speeds up the process of getting a conflict onto
the agenda. In most of the models, the effect of this variable
is time-dependent. A one standard deviation increase in mi-
grants (256,000) has an insignificant effect for the first few
weeks, after which it increases the hazard ratio by about 17
percent, then by 30–40 percent after three months, and by
37–58 percent after one year. This lends support to the claim
that spillovers have become a ground for international ac-
tion, and it is consistent with both Iwanami and Frederking
and Patane. However, the Council’s organizational mission
seems to matter less than its humanitarian mandate, in that
civilian deaths have a larger andmore immediate effect than
migrants on agenda-setting speed. Furthermore, while our
findings suggest that both P-5 interests and conflict severity
matter, unlike some UN intervention studies (Beardsley and
Schmidt 2012) we do not find that agenda setting is better
explained by normative considerations arising from conflict
severity or the UN’s organizational mission. To the contrary,
at the agenda-setting stage, we find the effect of parochial
interests to be much stronger than humanitarian or mission
concerns.
Drawing on insights from institutionalist theory, we
hypothesized that the E-10 matter, and that UNSC agenda-
setting speed could not be explained simply by looking
at P-5 interests and the level of human suffering. We also
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would have similar effects as P-5 parochial interests, but
that the direction of the effect was more likely to be posi-
tive (burden-sharing objectives) than negative (spheres of
influence concerns). The results strongly support our main
claim that E-10 states matter, but there is evidence that the
effect of their parochial interests cuts both ways.
Turning again to Model 1, the effect of E-10 alliances on
agenda-setting speed is the opposite as for P-5 alliances and
fits the burden-sharing perspective. As with the P-5, the ef-
fect of alliance ties depends on the number of allies and
is often time-dependent, but the more important lesson is
that overall the effect of E-10 alliances is arguably greater
than that of P-5 alliances. When only one or two E-10 mem-
bers have an alliance tie with the conflict state (25 percent
and 24 percent of the time), this has an insignificant effect
on the hazard ratio. But when three E-10 members have al-
liance ties with the conflict state (17 percent of the obser-
vations), the effect materializes after just twenty-one days, at
which point the hazard ratio increases by 136 percent, then
by 182 percent at three months, and by 236 percent at one
year. With four or more E-10 allies (just over 7 percent of
the observations), the hazard ratio increases by 214 percent
and the effect is immediate.
In Model 2, when an E-10 member is contiguous with the
target state (49 percent of the time) this reduces the hazard
ratio by 40 percent. This is yet further evidence that E-10
states matter, but we were somewhat surprised that the di-
rection of the effect was the same as for the P-5, as it suggests
that E-10 states close to a civil conflict want to keep the UN
out of their backyard. Perhaps E-10 members, too, consider
that they have spheres of influence, just with smaller radii.
That India wants to keep the conflict in Sri Lanka, and even
more so the Kashmir conflict, off the UN agenda illustrates
this point. In Model 3, the sign on the E-10 arms variable is
negative, pointing in the same direction as P-5 arms trans-
fers, but the coefficient is statistically insignificant. In Model
4, a one standard deviation increase in E-10 trade with the
conflict state has no effect on the hazard ratio for the first
week, but reduces it by 89 percent after a month, and by 95
percent after three months. As with contiguity, for trade the
direction of the effect was the same for the E-10 as for the
P-5, reinforcing our finding that E-10 members, too, have
perceived spheres of influence.
Our findings challenge the conventional wisdom that the
E-10 have little to no influence in the Council; or that they
entirely trade away their influence in exchange for bribes.
Rather, our results suggest that, in terms of agenda-setting
speed, the E-10 have considerable influence they use to ad-
vance their interests. This stands in sharp contrast to almost
all other systematic empirical studies on UN agenda setting,
peacekeeping, and intervention that have ignored the role
of the E-10 (the exception being Mikulaschek 2016).
Finally, the distribution of preferences in the Council has
so far not attracted much scholarly attention. We drew on
bargaining theory to hypothesize that general preference
heterogeneity among both the P-5 and the E-10, measured
by the range of UN ideal points, wouldmake reaching agree-
ments more difficult and increase the time needed to place
a conflict on the Council’s agenda. Results from all five mod-
els support our hypotheses, but the preference heterogene-
ity of the E-10 appears to matter even more than that of
the P-5, the effect of which wears off over time in all but
one of the models. In Model 1, a one standard deviation in-
crease (0.36) in P-5 heterogeneity reduces the hazard rate
by 33–60 percent during the first eighteen days of a conflict
but is statistically insignificant thereafter. In Models 2 and
3, it reduces the hazard rate by 53–71 percent during the
first week, by about 40 percent after one month, by 30 per-
cent after two months, and the effect wears off entirely af-
ter three-and-a-half months. In Model 5, it wears off entirely
after just forty-six days. For the E-10, by contrast, in most
models a one standard deviation increase (0.35) in prefer-
ence heterogeneity has an immediate and time-constant ef-
fect, reducing the hazard ratio by 35 percent. In Models 4
and 5, the effect of E-10 heterogeneity grows over time, re-
ducing the hazard ratio by about 38 percent during the first
week, then by 40–42 percent thereafter. That the E-10 have
more actors, which likely requires higher transaction costs
to form large coalitions, would explain why heterogeneity
among this group has a stronger effect on agenda-setting
speed than does P-5 heterogeneity.
To test the robustness of our findings, we fitted a num-
ber of additional models that included potential omitted
variables or altered the operationalization of our main inde-
pendent variables. First, we considered two additional char-
acteristics of the conflict state: its geographic location and
its regime type. Work on UN intervention has found that
the deployment of peacekeepers is biased in favor of cer-
tain regions of the world (Mullenbach 2005; Fortna 2008;
Beardsley and Schmidt 2012). And while the argument is
theoretically ambiguous in terms of the direction of the ef-
fect (Gilligan and Stedman 2003, 40), some have claimed
that UN intervention depends on whether or not the tar-
get state is a democracy (Fortna 2008). We coded the loca-
tion of the conflict state using the set of “region” dummies
from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset, and its level
of democracy using the well-known Polity2 measure. A word
of caution is in order. There is a clear risk of post-treatment
bias here, since the variables used to capture the parochial
interests of UNSC members (especially arms transfers and
alliance ties) are almost certainly related in part to the re-
gion and regime type of the conflict state.
We also considered two temporal factors that might af-
fect our results. Ten percent of our conflict episodes be-
gan during the Cold War and lasted beyond its end without
having reached the UNSC agenda. Perhaps there is some-
thing distinctive about these episodes and the fact that be-
fore becoming at risk of making the agenda they spent time
frozen out by the UNSC’s Cold War paralysis. To assess this
possibility, we created a “span Cold War” dummy similar to
Gilligan and Stedman’s (2003, 42) use of a dummy to ac-
count for civil wars that began during the Cold War but were
still active after it ended. We noted earlier that some con-
flicts experienced multiple episodes. But how this “previous
episode” dummy might affect agenda-setting speed is not
obvious. On the one hand, we might expect that the squeaky
wheel gets the oil, so that the second (or subsequent) time
a conflict flares up, the more likely it is to draw attention
and thus the faster it will reach the UNSC’s agenda. Alter-
natively, if a conflict has already breached twenty-five fatal-
ities per year and then waned without the UNSC putting it
on their agenda, those wanting to revisit the matter when
the conflict flares up again might face the problem of issue
fatigue. If so, the existence of a previous episode could slow
down the rate at which subsequent episodes made the UNSC
agenda.
We also considered an alternative operationalization of
our alliance ties and human suffering variables. Instead of
counting all forms of alliances, we restricted the focus to just
defense pacts, as some previous studies of UN intervention
have done (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012). This produced
the ordinal measures P5dpacts and E10dpacts. And as an
alternative measure of human suffering, we replaced our
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battle deaths, taken from the UCDP Battle Related Deaths
dataset.
We mentioned earlier that whichever state holds the
rotating UNSC presidency exercises some discretion over
the agenda. Not explicitly modelling this discretion may
affect our findings. However, as we explain more in the
supplementary online appendix, we know of no available
theories to guide the analysis, and expectations would
likely be indeterminate or idiosyncratic to the particular
state and conflict. Nevertheless, we undertook exploratory
analyses and found that none of our findings changed when
we controlled for several systematic aspects of the UNSC
presidency: whether the president is from a permanent
or elected member, whether the president’s state has an
alliance with the conflict state, the geographic distance
between the president’s state and the conflict state, and
the political difference between the president’s state and
the conflict state as measured by their respective UN ideal
points and Polity regime scores.
Tables A1–A9 in the appendix present the results of these
robustness checks. All of our main findings hold up well,
apart from the E-10 contiguity variable, which in some of
the models retains the negative sign but drops below con-
ventional levels of statistical significance. It is noteworthy
that, unlike civilian deaths, the battle deaths variable was
consistently insignificant. This supports existing studies on
agenda setting in the Council in which the number of battle
deaths tests out as insignificant (Iwanami 2011; Frederking
and Patane 2017).
Conclusion
This article has, for the first time, examined the speed with
which civil conflicts enter the Council’s agenda. Agenda-
setting speed matters: including a conflict on the Coun-
cil’s agenda is a necessary condition for further Council
action; it sends a costly signal to relevant audiences; once
included on the agenda, conflicts tend to become “sticky”;
and Council members themselves attach a great deal of im-
portance to the Council’s agenda-setting processes. Further-
more, unlike the decision-making stage, the five permanent
members cannot use their veto to block items from reach-
ing the Council’s agenda, at least not formally. In our view,
this warrants an analysis of agenda-setting speed in its own
right.
To explain variation in the speed with which civil con-
flicts reach the Council’s agenda (if they reach it at all),
we proposed a theoretical framework that combines real-
ist and constructivist theory with insights from institution-
alist theory and from bargaining theory. We find that in sit-
uations of civil conflict, parochial P-5 interests matter, and
they matter strongly. However, P-5 parochial interests do
not determine the Council’s agenda-setting speed. Rather, P-
5 interests are constrained in three important ways. First,
agenda-setting speed is affected by the conflict’s severity in
terms of spillover effects. The UN is more likely to respond
quickly to conflicts that threaten its organizational mission
(preventing regional destabilization) and, even more so,
to those that involve large-scale civilian deaths. Second, E-
10 parochial interests—almost entirely ignored in previous
UNSC research—are an important part of the story. When
the E-10 have alliance ties with a country experiencing civil
conflict, they tend to seek burden sharing, speeding up the
agenda-setting process. Yet when conflicts occur in their
backyard, they seem to be no different from the P-5 and
slow it down. Third and finally, P-5 parochial interests are
constrained by the distribution of preferences both among
the P-5 and among the E-10. When preference heterogene-
ity is low, this makes it easier for Council members to swiftly
include a civil conflict on the Council’s agenda.
Importantly, while all of our hypotheses enjoyed support,
we also found that some factors have more explanatory
power than others, in that the effect of the E-10 on agenda-
setting speed can be greater than that of the P-5, and that
parochial interests and general preference heterogeneity
appear to play a bigger role in UNSC agenda setting than do
conflict characteristics and the UN’s organizational mission.
Our results account for why it takes more than three years
on average for a conflict episode to be put on the agenda,
and why only 30 percent of these episodes ever reach the
agenda: episodes have a dramatically reduced hazard ratio
and are thus far less likely to ever reach the agenda (or
only after a long delay) if they involve few civilian deaths
or migrants, if any P-5 member has an alliance tie with or
transfers arms to the conflict state, if any UNSC member is
contiguous with the conflict state, if P-5 or E-10 members
have strong trade links with the conflict state, or if E-10
members hold highly diverse general preferences. When
several of these conditions obtain at once, the hazard ratio
is miniscule.
Our findings also have important implications for
the Council’s legitimacy, in terms of both performance
legitimacy and procedural legitimacy. Using a research
design that is different from ours, Frederking and Patane
(2017) conclude that the Council has a high level of le-
gitimacy because the most devastating conflicts dominate
the Council’s agenda. But they look at the number of
formal Council meetings per conflict each year, whereas we
measure the time elapsed between when a conflict episode
became active and when it first entered the Council’s
agenda. Thus, in our conceptualization the UN is more
legitimate if devastating conflicts reach the agenda faster.
For the UNSC’s performance legitimacy, it makes a big
difference whether a crisis reaches the Council’s agenda
rapidly and is discussed in public, or whether a crisis goes
on for a long time without any exposure at a UNSC meeting
and no chance of further action. Our findings are consistent
with a legitimate Council that takes its mandate seriously,
addressing more promptly conflicts that produce substan-
tial human suffering and massive negative externalities for
neighboring countries.
But our findings also help us assess an important ele-
ment of the Council’s procedural legitimacy by demonstrat-
ing how issues reach the agenda. Do parochial interests
of the powerful permanent members skew agenda-setting
speed? Surprisingly, Frederking and Patane (2017) do not
find that P-5 interests determine which conflicts dominate
the Council’s agenda, suggesting legitimate Council pro-
cedures. Our findings, by contrast, yield a more nuanced
picture. We show that narrow P-5 interests definitely affect
the speed of agenda setting in important ways, but also
that the Council does not appear to be an entirely illegiti-
mate P-5 dominated elite club in which the elected mem-
bers trade away their influence in exchange for bribes. In-
stead, the P-5 need to reach out to the E-10, rendering
the agenda-setting process more inclusive of a larger set of
interests.
In this article, we have taken a first stab at analyzing
agenda-setting speed in the UNSC. There are at least three
avenues for further research. First, while we have argued for
the importance of studying the agenda-setting stage in its
own right, we fully recognize that the story does not end
here. Our work invites attention to the speed of what comes
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onto the Council’s agenda. Second, agenda setting matters
not only in the UN, but in other international institutions
too. There are a few studies now on the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) (Moody and Saravia 2013; McDowell 2017),
but overall our knowledge of agenda setting in IOs remains
limited. More comparative research is needed to explain po-
tential differences in agenda setting across IOs. Finally, we
have assumed that—on average—quicker agenda setting is
likely to prevent conflict escalation, but we have not tested
this assumption. Future research should investigate whether
there is a systematic link between the speed with which con-
flicts reach the UNSC’s agenda and the effect this has on
the UN’s success in terms of conflict resolution, peacekeep-
ing, or sanctions. Pursuing these avenues would contribute
to better understanding of how IOs work, their effectiveness,
and their legitimacy.
Supplementary Information
Supplementary information is available at the International
Studies Quarterly data archive.
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